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Cytat
Do celu tam się wysiada. Lec Stanisław Jerzy (pierw. de Tusch-Letz, 1909-1966)
A bogowie grają w kości i nie pytają wcale czy chcesz przyłączyć się do gry (. . . ) Bogowie kpią sobie z twojego poukładanego życia (. . . ) nie przejmują się zbytnio ani naszymi planami na przyszłość ani oczekiwaniami. Gdzieś we wszechświecie rzucają kości i przypadkiem wypada twoja kolej. I odtąd zwyciężyć lub przegrać - to tylko kwestia szczęścia. Borys Pasternak
Idąc po kurzych jajach nie podskakuj. Przysłowie szkockie
I Herkules nie poradzi przeciwko wielu.
Dialog półinteligentów równa się monologowi ćwierćinteligenta. Stanisław Jerzy Lec (pierw. de Tusch - Letz, 1909-1966)
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.Western countries are suspicious of Iranenriching high-grade uranium gas necessary for the development of atomic bombs.In the light of rising pressure from Washington and Tel Aviv to confront Iran because of itsalleged nuclear program s military nature, Tehran was forced into negotiations over its nuclearprogram.As the U.S. the initial denouncer renounced any direct talks with Iran, the so-calledEU-3 composed of France, Great Britain, and Germany was commissioned to hold talks withthe Iranians.As we will now see, due to fundamental negotiating errors, progress was not being39 made during the talks.The question which now arises is whether Iran s hardliners are playing apower game with this hot issue or are there reliable and rational reasons for Tehran s repeatedrejection, which have been, and still are, ignored in the Western discourse on this matter?a) Tehran Agreement (October 2003) and Ongoing Demagogy In the first agreement signed between Iran and the EU-3, Tehran agreed to sign and implementthe Additional Protocol to the NPT which it did on Dec.18, 2003 that permits snap inspec-tions of its nuclear sites.Besides that, Iran, as a confidence-building measure, has decided volun-tarily to suspend all uranium enrichment and reprocessing activities as defined by the IAEA. (IMFA2003) In return, the Europeans represented by then-Foreign Ministers Dominique de Villepin,Jack Straw, and Joschka Fischer assured to prevent Washington from handing the Iranian nuc-lear dossier to the UNSC.Previously, the IAEA had found weapons-grade-enriched uranium attwo sites in Iran.The country blamed the findings on contamination from parts it bought abroadon the black market, as a result of the U.S.-imposed embargo on the country (KOCH 2004).34 Thiswas also later confirmed by the IAEA (VON RANDOW 2004).Moreover, the EU-3 promised to sup-port Iran in the peaceful use of nuclear energy (anyway required by the NPT) and further vowedbroad economic relations with Tehran.The Agreement was considered a positive step (HAFEZI & EVANS 2003) and French ForeignMinister de Villepin even expected the final resolution of latent problems (NIRUMAND 2006: 26).Until mid-November 2004, the IAEA found no evidence that Iran had followed any prohibitedactivities and acknowledged full cooperation by Iran (GOV/2003/75; GOV/2004/83).Already inFebruary 2004, the suspension in relation to all kinds of enrichment and enrichment-relatedactivities was prolonged by Tehran.Washington s hard stance vis-à-vis Iran provoked harsh criticism by leading U.S.figures innon-neoconservative camps.For instance, in mid-November 2004, Zbigniew Brzezinski calledthe American view that fundamentalist mullahs in Iran would threaten global security as irra-tional and paranoid slogans. This would ominously remind of the demagogy legitimizing theuse of force against Iraq.35 He further noted that Iran is not a notoriously aggressive country andthat the U.S.should be appreciative of any Iranian nuclear ambition as a tool of deterrence.3634Cf.also Javad Zarif s, Iran s Ambassador to the U.N., remarks in an interview on Dec.7, 2004, with BBCHARDTalk s Tim Sebastian: Iran has been deprived of the means to acquire technology for the past over twodecades.At the same time Iranian people are very proud and we have the necessary scientific infrastructure.We've had to go through the black market because the open market was close to us in order to acquire technol-ogy. Video s URL.35The original reads: Das sind doch irrationale und paranoide Slogans.Diese Argumentation erinnert verdäch-tig an die Demagogie, die vor dem Irak-Krieg verbreitet wurde und mit der dann die Gewalt gerechtfertigt wur-de. 36The original reads: Man kann verstehen, dass die Iraner überzeugt sind, genau diese Waffen [Atombom-ben A.F.-N.] haben zu müssen.Teherans nukleare Ambitionen sind unter anderem darauf zurückzuführen,dass man dort über ein Mittel der Abschreckung verfügen will.Der Iran selbst ist ja kein notorisch aggressives40 Selective engagement by Washington i
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