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Cytat
Do celu tam się wysiada. Lec Stanisław Jerzy (pierw. de Tusch-Letz, 1909-1966)
A bogowie grają w kości i nie pytają wcale czy chcesz przyłączyć się do gry (. . . ) Bogowie kpią sobie z twojego poukładanego życia (. . . ) nie przejmują się zbytnio ani naszymi planami na przyszłość ani oczekiwaniami. Gdzieś we wszechświecie rzucają kości i przypadkiem wypada twoja kolej. I odtąd zwyciężyć lub przegrać - to tylko kwestia szczęścia. Borys Pasternak
Idąc po kurzych jajach nie podskakuj. Przysłowie szkockie
I Herkules nie poradzi przeciwko wielu.
Dialog półinteligentów równa się monologowi ćwierćinteligenta. Stanisław Jerzy Lec (pierw. de Tusch - Letz, 1909-1966)
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.NE V.4.1132b15 16).An exemption (ateleia) mayalso be granted to citizens in certain cases, for example from military service ortaxation (see Pol.II.9.1270b1 6).x Thus Aristotle uses locutions correspondingto all four of Hohfeld s rights-relations.This shows the weakness of the lexicalargument from the premiss that Aristotle lacks a single word corresponding tothe generic English substantival noun right to the conclusion that he does nothave a concept of rights.The just claim locution (to dikaion) is the most important, because it captureswhat is essential to a right: a claim of justice against others.The next section willargue that this relation is at the core of political rights as Aristotle understandsthem.But first it is necessary to get clear about this relation.One obviousdifficulty is that not all duties entail rights.For example, the commandmentin the Mosaic code not to covet one s neighbour s ox does not imply that theneighbour has a right not have his ox coveted.Likewise, for Aristotle, not allduties will involve correlative rights.For example, if some friends contributeu For other occurrences of to dikaion see NE V.4.1132a19 24; Pol.III.1.1275a8 10,III.9.1280b11, 12.1282b18 30, IV.4.1291a39 40.v For other occurrences of exousia and exeinai, see Pol.IV.4.1291b40 1, 5.1292a41,IV.6.1292b35 7, V.12.1316b3 5.w For other occurrences of kyrios, see Pol.II.12.1274a15 18, III.14.1285b10, 15.1286b31 3,VII.3.1325a35.x The term akuros is also used for a disability, see NE VII.9.1151b15, Rhet.I.15.1376b11 29,Ath.Pol.45.3 4. Virtue and Rights in Aristotle 71equally to buy a pizza, each of them has a just claim against the others to an equalshare of pizza, which entails that each of the others has a duty not to take morethan their fair share.But duties of charity do not entail rights.Even if someonehas a duty of charity to give some pizza to a homeless person, the recipient wouldnot thereby have a right to it.Similarly, even if someone has a duty based onmoderation to abstain from eating all his entire portion, the others would notthereby have a right to the remainder.In an earlier work I tried to solve this problem by treating the duty as anecessary condition for the just claim: x has a just claim against y to ø only if Yhas a duty to x to ø.The rationale for that was that the just claim is in somesense more basic than, and helps to ground, the correlative duty (Miller 1995:95 6).y Vivienne Brown has persuasively objected, however, that this proposaldeparts in a significant way from Hohfeld s scheme where claims and duties aretrue correlatives.Moreover, as Brown points out, this gives rise to a theoreticalproblem: there would need to be either an alternative sufficient condition for aclaim-right or a theoretical account of the two different kinds of duties so thatthose that are correlative to a claim-right can be differentiated from those that arenot (Brown 2001: 274).It seems clear that the latter is the appropriate strategy:a just claim has as its correlative a duty of justice (as contrasted, for example, witha duty of charity).But, if so, then there is no reason to weaken the requirementby treating the duty as a mere necessary condition for the just claim.Rather, weshould make it necessary and sufficient, and say that x has a just claim against yif, and only if, y has a duty of justice to x.Other kinds of duties that y mighthave (based on other virtues such as bravery, temperance, or generosity) do notinvolve correlative just claims.Another issue concerns the content of the right in question.As noted earlier,x s just claim to y s øing involves y s correlative duty to x to ø, for example torepay a debt.This suggests that the claim-holder is essentially passive and theduty-holder essentially active.On this basis, Brown has also objected that there isa problem with talking about one having a claim to have or do something todisputed goods, to citizenship, to act as a defendant or prosecutor in a courtof law, to political office. She argues that this entails transposing the actiondenoted by the just claim from the right-holder to the duty-holder, so that x sjust claim is not that y øs but that x can ø.What was, on the Hohfeldian analysis,a merely passive right has thus been transformed into an active right
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