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Cytat
Do celu tam się wysiada. Lec Stanisław Jerzy (pierw. de Tusch-Letz, 1909-1966)
A bogowie grają w kości i nie pytają wcale czy chcesz przyłączyć się do gry (. . . ) Bogowie kpią sobie z twojego poukładanego życia (. . . ) nie przejmują się zbytnio ani naszymi planami na przyszłość ani oczekiwaniami. Gdzieś we wszechświecie rzucają kości i przypadkiem wypada twoja kolej. I odtąd zwyciężyć lub przegrać - to tylko kwestia szczęścia. Borys Pasternak
Idąc po kurzych jajach nie podskakuj. Przysłowie szkockie
I Herkules nie poradzi przeciwko wielu.
Dialog półinteligentów równa się monologowi ćwierćinteligenta. Stanisław Jerzy Lec (pierw. de Tusch - Letz, 1909-1966)
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. CHAPTER 3 DELIGHTED CUSTOMERS 77problems with fearless vigor and amazingly disciplined attention todetail.They tackled the three flight systems one at a time.First theydesigned a control system to keep from crashing; then they studiedlift aerodynamics in detail and learned how to design the wings.Onlyafter those two problems were solved did they add a propulsion sys-tem.This methodical approach enabled them to solve three extremelydemanding technical problems in three years.Great problem solvers start by developing a deep understanding ofthe situation through direct experience.They collaborate with peoplewho have different perspectives and knowledge.They are creative, ef-ficient, and highly disciplined in uncovering the essential problemsand designing possible solutions.They test multiple ideas and focuson learning as much as they can.They ask a lot of questions and chal-lenge assumptions, even their own assumptions.They regularly stepback and reframe the situation to be sure they are solving the rightproblem.If you are an entrepreneur today, you probably proceed more or lessin this fashion.But if you are in a big company or a government de-partment, you probably do not approach the development of a difficultsystem as a design problem; you are more likely to see it as an execu-tion problem or a project management problem.But proceeding with asolution absent a good understanding of the underlying problem is alltoo often a recipe for disaster.Case: The FBI Case Management SystemThe FBI Case Management System debacle no, make that plural:debacles have been blamed on many things.A decade of pouringbuckets of money down the drain with nothing to show for it gen-erates many excuses.From 2001 to 2004, $170 million was wastedbefore the Virtual Case File System was discarded.So what happenednext? They tried again, forgetting Einstein s admonition that insanityis doing the same thing and expecting different results.The secondfiasco was called Sentinel.Jerome Israel, the FBI s Chief Technical Of-ficer from 2004 to 2009, published an article in IEEE Computer aboutjust what went wrong.8Israel noted that in 2005, the RFP (request for proposal) team wastoo busy generating requirements to build prototypes that would help8.Jerome Israel, Why the FBI Can t Build a Case Management System, IEEE Com-puter 45, no.6 (June 2012). 78 THE LEAN MINDSETclarify the most challenging technical issues.The reason was not sim-ply a lack of time; the RFP team and the FBI in general did not havethe engineering strength to really understand the nature of the prob-lems that needed to be solved.Responses to the RFP showed that ven-dors had also failed to engage in really understanding the complexityof the system.In his article, Israel listed three wicked problems thatan FBI case management system must resolve, problems that were notclearly understood or adequately addressed throughout the failed de-velopment effort.First of all there was a deeply complex access se-curity problem that defied definition, let alone resolution.Second,there was a tricky migration problem, because a big-bang cutover wasclearly not going to work.Third, there was every intention to use com-mercial off-the-shelf software, but integrating these disparate systemswas wicked hard, according to Israel.To compensate for its lack of engineering skill, the FBI decided toemphasize program management.Program managers with no techni-cal background were put in positions senior to government engineerswho might understand the technical problems.The project manage-ment approach focused on tracking activity, not on making sure thatthe difficult technical problems were uncovered and addressed.A contract for the Sentinel project was signed in March 2006 withdelivery scheduled for December 2009.After 18 months Phase 1 wasdelivered, a Web-based interface to existing systems.Phase 2 wouldbe the really difficult phase, so an iterative delivery approach was ad-opted.This would seem to be a good idea, but due to pressure to showregular progress, the focus of development turned toward the easystuff; the really serious engineering that needed to be done was putaside.In October 2009, after two years of favorable progress reports,the wicked problems finally had to be faced
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