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Cytat
Do celu tam się wysiada. Lec Stanisław Jerzy (pierw. de Tusch-Letz, 1909-1966)
A bogowie grają w kości i nie pytają wcale czy chcesz przyłączyć się do gry (. . . ) Bogowie kpią sobie z twojego poukładanego życia (. . . ) nie przejmują się zbytnio ani naszymi planami na przyszłość ani oczekiwaniami. Gdzieś we wszechświecie rzucają kości i przypadkiem wypada twoja kolej. I odtąd zwyciężyć lub przegrać - to tylko kwestia szczęścia. Borys Pasternak
Idąc po kurzych jajach nie podskakuj. Przysłowie szkockie
I Herkules nie poradzi przeciwko wielu.
Dialog półinteligentów równa się monologowi ćwierćinteligenta. Stanisław Jerzy Lec (pierw. de Tusch - Letz, 1909-1966)
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.What thiscriterion indicates is one of the reasons why conceptualism alone is inadequateas a formal ontology and needs to be extended to include an intensional realismof abstract objects as the intensional contents of both denials and assertions aswell as of our predicable concepts.7.7 The Content of Referential ConceptsThe fundamental insight into the nature of abstract objects, according to con-ceptual realism, is that we are able to grasp and have knowledge of such objectsas the objectified truth conditions of the concepts whose contents they are.This object -ification of truth conditions is realized through a reflexive abstractionin which we attempt to represent what is not an object e.g., an unsaturatedcognitive structure underlying our use of a predicate expression as if it werean object.In language this reflexive abstraction is institutionalized in the rule-based linguistic process of nominalization.As already noted, we do not assume an independent realm of Platonic formsin conceptual realism in order to account for abstract objects and the logic ofnominalized predicates.Conceptual realism is not the same as either logicalrealism or conceptual Platonism.Some of the reasons why this is so are:1.The abstract objects of conceptual realism are not entities that are predi-cated of things the way they are in logical realism and conceptualPlatonism i.e., they are not unsaturated entities and therefore they donot have a predicative nature in conceptual realism.2.The abstract objects of logical realism and conceptual Platonism existindependently of the evolution of culture and consciousness, whereas inconceptual realism all abstract objects, including numbers, are productsof the evolution of language and culture.Nevertheless, although they are17Learning how to correctly use such an expression may of course be a more difficult cognitiveprocess than learning simpler predicate expressions. 154 CHAPTER 7.THE NEXUS OF PREDICATIONproducts of cultural evolution, they also have both a certain amount of au-tonomy and an essential role in the continuing evolution and developmentof knowledge and culture.183.In logical realism, abstract objects are objects of direct awareness, whereasin conceptual realism all knowledge must be grounded in psychologicalstates and processes.In other words, we cannot have knowledge of abstractobjects if our grasp of them as objects must be through some form ofdirect awareness.According to conceptual realism we are able to graspand have knowledge of abstract objects only as the intensional contentsof the concepts that underlie reference and predication in language andthought.That is, we are able to grasp abstract objects as the object -ified truth conditions of our concepts as cognitive capacities.The reflexive abstraction that transforms the intensional content of an un-saturated predicable concept into an abstract object is a process that is notnormally achieved until post-adolescence.An even more difficult kind of re-flexive abstraction also occurs at this time.It is a double reflexive abstractionthat transforms the intensional content of a referential concept into a predicableconcept, and then that predicable concept into an abstract object.The full process from referential concept to abstract object is doubly complexbecause it involves a reflexive abstraction on the result of a reflexive abstraction.Where A is a name (proper or common, and complex or simple), and Q is aquantifier (determiner), we define the predicate that is the result of the firstreflexive abstraction as follows:[QxA] =df [»x("F)(x = F '" (QxA)F(x))].In this definition the quantifier phrase (QxA) is transformed into a complexpredicate (»-abstract), which can then be nominalized in turn as an abstractsingular term that purports to denote the intensional content of being a conceptF such that (QxA)F(x).Consider, for example, an assertion of the sentence Sofia seeks a unicorn ,which can be analyzed as follows19:[Sofia]NP [seeks [a unicorn]]VP“!“! “!("xSofia)[»xSeek(x, ["yUnicorn])](x)No reference to a unicorn is being made in this assertion.Instead, the referen-tial concept that the phrase a unicorn stands for has been deactivated in thespeech act.This deactivation is represented on the initial level of analysis bytransforming the quantifier phrase into an abstract singular term denoting itsintensional content.Note that the relational predicate seek in this example is18See Popper 1967, p.106, and chapter P2 of Popper & Eccles 1983 for a similar view ofabstract objects.19This example is from Montague 1974. 7.7.THE CONTENT OF REFERENTIAL CONCEPTS 155not extensional in its second argument position.What that means is that onthe lower level of representing truth conditions and logical consequences, thesentence does not imply that there is a unicorn that Sofia seeks.But the dif-ferent assertion that Sofia finds a unicorn, which is symbolized in an entirelysimilar way:SofiaNP [finds [a unicorn]]VP“! “! “!("xSofia)[»xFind(x, ["yUnicorn])](x)does imply that there exists a unicorn, and moreover that it has been found bySofia.That is, the following("yUnicorn)("xSofia)Finds(x, y).is a logical consequence of the above sentence.Thus, even though the twodifferent sentences,("xSofia)[»xSeek(x, ["yUnicorn])](x)("xSofia)[»xFind(x, ["yUnicorn])](x)have the same logical form, and therefore represent essentially the same cognitivestructure of a speech or mental act, even though only one of them implies thatthere is a unicorn.The reason why the one sentence implies that there is a unicorn and theother does not is that the relational predicate find , but not the predicate seek ,is extensional in its second argument position.The extensionality of find isrepresented by the following meaning postulate20:[»xFinds(x, ["yA])] = [»x("yA)Finds(x, y)]
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