Podobne
- Strona startowa
- § Saylor Steven Roma sub rosa 05 Ostatnie sprawy Gordianusa
- Saylor Steven Roma sub rosa t Morderstwo na Via Appia
- Saylor Steven Roma sub rosa t Ramiona Nemezis
- Saylor Steven Roma sub rosa t Dom Westalek
- [4 1]Erikson Steven Dom Lancu Dawne Dni
- Brust Steven Jhereg (SCAN dal 866)
- [5 2]Eriskon Steven Przyplywy Siodme zamkniecie
- Czerwone i czarne t.1 Stendhal
- Petersin Thomas Ogrodnik Szoguna (2)
- Joseph Heller Paragraf 22
- zanotowane.pl
- doc.pisz.pl
- pdf.pisz.pl
- mieszaniec.xlx.pl
Cytat
Do celu tam się wysiada. Lec Stanisław Jerzy (pierw. de Tusch-Letz, 1909-1966)
A bogowie grają w kości i nie pytają wcale czy chcesz przyłączyć się do gry (. . . ) Bogowie kpią sobie z twojego poukładanego życia (. . . ) nie przejmują się zbytnio ani naszymi planami na przyszłość ani oczekiwaniami. Gdzieś we wszechświecie rzucają kości i przypadkiem wypada twoja kolej. I odtąd zwyciężyć lub przegrać - to tylko kwestia szczęścia. Borys Pasternak
Idąc po kurzych jajach nie podskakuj. Przysłowie szkockie
I Herkules nie poradzi przeciwko wielu.
Dialog półinteligentów równa się monologowi ćwierćinteligenta. Stanisław Jerzy Lec (pierw. de Tusch - Letz, 1909-1966)
[ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]
.OVERRELIANCE ON OUR MILITARYThe military has a significant role to play in a middle course for America,but we have a tendency to overrely on it which is very dangerous.Our mediais now correctly pointing out the significance of the American military andthe risk of our political leaders overusing it.“The United States alone hasa military that can project force anywhere on the globe, fight and win,” areporter wrote.“America’s technological advantage in warfare has become solarge that, despite the ritual references to coalition forces, the Pentagon findsit more of a burden than a benefit to have allies in combat.(It demonstratedthis by turning down offers of assistance for the fighting in Afghanistan.TheDepartment of Defense’s desire for assistance in peacekeeping is anotherissue entirely.)” 14The United States today has one clearly effective strategic advantage: itsmilitary.Presidents are most likely to be successful in international relationswhen they use it, and most likely to be unsuccessful when they do not.As aresult they overuse the military, and misuse it.For example, the limitations ofour execution of small scale military operations against terrorists employinghigh technology weapons are described in convincing detail in Sean Naylor’sstudy of Operation Anaconda in Afghanistan.15 The danger is that we areP1: FCW0521857449c17Printer: cupusbwCUNY475B/Rosefielde0 521 85744 9November 6, 20067:26The Middle Course399not as good at this as we think; and that as we give small scale antiterroristoperations a greater priority, we lessen our ability to counter and deter majorpowers that might become our enemy.16Dana Priest, a reporter for the Washington Post studied the matter.“USleaders have been turning more and more to the military to solve prob-lems that are often at their root political and economic,” she concluded.17Ms.Priest argues that this is because the United States has allowed its civil-ian foreign service to decline and that its result is that the United Statesfails to lead the world toward peace.Her broad point about the overuseof the American military for inappropriate missions is well taken, but herinferences as to cause and consequence are both questionable.The cause isthe paradox that non-state conflict merges military and political much moreclosely, so that the distinction she makes between a military approach andpolitical approach is outdated.It follows that her preferred civilian politicalapproach may be no more effective than a military approach.We must eitherenhance the political capability of our military (which we’re doing), or theforce-using capability of our diplomats, or find some way to team them.But we’re not yet doing that effectively.“The two major phases of the[Afghanistan] conflict have been considered independently,” commenta-tors report.“Specialists in military affairs study the campaign.largelyignoring.implications for the subsequent political turmoil.Students ofAfghanistan’s political situation, on the other hand, tend to ignore the sig-nificance of the way in which the military campaign itself was conducted.Neither approach by itself will do.”18Our limited success in Afghanistan is a result of our failure to moreclosely interconnect military and political efforts.Had we placed an Armydivision and a Marine combat unit or a little more in Afghanistan, we’dhave been able to much better influence subsequent political developmentsthere.Our failure to do this let al-Qaeda disperse much of its organizationoutside the country, forcing us to hunt them down all over the world.Thiswas therefore “an opportunity missed,” through our failure to consider thepolitical consequences of how we took military action (that the Afghangovernment which followed our military success would be too weak todismantle al-Qaeda), and the military consequences of our political actions(that because the Afghan government couldn’t dismantle al-Qaeda, we’dhave to put our military to chasing them down all over the world).19This is the paradox of terrorist warfare – that its military tactics involvemore politics than in the past.For example, when adversaries fire fromchurches, mosques, schools and hospitals, to attract fire in return and causecivilian casualties, then our troops have to have available countercrowdP1: FCW0521857449c17Printer: cupusbwCUNY475B/Rosefielde0 521 85744 9November 6, 20067:26400Leading Toward Peacemeasures such as tear gas, power water hoses, rubber bullets, and so on, torespond without inflicting civilian casualties – the political nature of thechallenge requires a political response.The problem here is that the United States separates the two.War is thefailure of diplomacy: “.the crushing weight of failed statescraft.”20But this is a false dichotomy between diplomacy and war.War is theextension of diplomacy; and diplomacy the extension of war; and neither isabsolute or excludes the other, and it’s a continuing and serious failure ofAmerican thinking in all areas that it makes this distinction so absolutely.Yetreality raises its head via inconsistency.The author cited here writes on hernext page about “blending diplomacy and force.” which is the oppositeconcept and the proper one.21At the tactical level, the error is extended when a president announces inadvance that he won’t commit ground troops to an operation because thisshows his limits and weakens bargaining.Clinton did this with respect tothe Bosnia and Kosovo operations.After our invasion the political situation in Afghanistan has deteriorated
[ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]